

The Session on Cyber Security

A View on Cyber Security Topics Relating Automated Driving

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


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
Vehicle-to-X Networks

- Message Authentication Codes/
Digital Signatures
- Cryptographic Key Management
- Trust Management




In-Vehicle Network

- Message Authentication Codes/
Digital Signatures
- Cryptographic Key Management
- Security Supply Chain Management




Automatic Driving

- Control Mechanisms
 - Algorithms
 - Data




Mapping

Between Physical and Cyber Worlds




Threats on Mapping

Between Physical and Cyber Worlds




Instrumentation Security for Observation




Instrumentation Security for Control

Threats to Instrumentation

- Attack to
1. Integrity
 2. Availability
 3. Confidentiality




LIDAR ToF Multi Echo Detection



LIDAR: Light Detection and Ranging ToF: Time of Flight

Instrumentation Security Evaluation for LIDAR




- **Light for Attack** which is mimicking the **Light for Measurement** is **emitted to the Sensor** → **Distance Masquerading**

Type of Distance Masquerading \ Existence of Attack Equipment	Detactable	Undetectable
	Far than Real	[1], [2]
Near than Real	[3]	

- [1] J. Petit, B. Stottelaar, M. Feiri, F. Kargl, "Remote Attacks on Automated Vehicles Sensors: Experiments on Camera and LiDAR," Black Hat Europe 2015.
- [2] K. Soma, D. Fujimoto, T. Matsumoto, "Instrumentation Security of a Pulse LIDAR System against Reflected Light Masquerading", IEICE Tech. Rep., vol.116, no.35, ISEC2016-9, pp.37-44, May 2016.
- [3] K. Soma, D. Fujimoto, T. Matsumoto, "Instrumentation Security of a Ranging Pulse LIDAR System Against Reflected Light Spoofing", IEICE Symposium on Cryptography and Information Security, SCIS 2017, 2E1-2, Okinawa, January 2017.

Instrumentation Security Evaluation for ToF Distance Imaging Camera



- **Light for Attack** which is mimicking the **Light for Measurement** is **emitted to the Object** → **Distance Masquerading**



[4] S. Sakurazawa, D. Fujimoto, and T. Matsumoto, "Demonstrating Pulse-Light Spoofing for a ToF Depth Image Camera", IEICE Symposium on Cryptography and Information Security, SCIS 2017, 2E1-1, Okinawa, January 2017. CIS 2017, Okinawa, January 2017.

(1) $z = n (< d)$

(2) $z = f (> d)$

(3) No output
(z is unavailable)

Detector



Vehicle's Sensor with
Output z


(1) $z = n < x$
May cause
crash against the
following vehicles

x
(the real distance)

(2) $z = f > d$
May cause a
severe traffic
accident with
personal injury


Instrumentation Security

Need for Evaluation
and Strengthening
Technologies
and/or
Certification Schemes



Threats on Mapping

Between Physical and Cyber Worlds



Thank you!

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